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The myth that cyberspace is a legal Wild West has been roundly 
rejected by states and scholars. As cyberspace norms evolve, states 
will advocate interpretations of existing international law rules that 
advance their national interests. In this regard, states are treating 
international law rules as normative firewalls that safeguard their 
interests by deterring malevolent behavior. At the same time, 
states are interpreting the rules in a manner that maximizes their 
response options when facing hostile cyber operations.
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In February 2020, Adm. Mike Gilday, the U.S. chief of naval operations, observed that “We’re not fighting an enemy that peo-ple can see … And we’re not fighting a war 
where international norms exist. But make no mis-
take, we are in conflict day-in and day-out in the cy-
ber realm.”1 His remarks came on the heels of U.N. 
Secretary-General António Guterres’ pronounce-
ment that “We … must usher in order to the Wild 
West of cyberspace,”2 a characterization of that do-
main utilized by President Barack Obama five years 
earlier when he remarked, “The cyber world is sort 
of the wild, wild West. And to some degree, we’re 
asked to be the sheriff.”3 
Gilday, Guterres, and Obama were not suggest-
ing that cyberspace is a legal void. Both the United 
Nations and the United States have emphasized 
international law’s applicability to cyber conflict.4 
However, their statements could be understood as 
suggesting that international law might not be up 
to the task of governing cyberspace. 
This apparent skepticism has been exacerbat-
ed by the practice of some states to “cherry-pick” 
amongst the international law rules that govern 
cyberspace. In 2017, for instance, the U.N. Group 
of Governmental Experts charged with identifying 
consensus norms for cyberspace failed to agree on 
including references to such fundamental aspects 
of international law as “self-defense” and “interna-
tional humanitarian law” in its report due to oppo-
sition from Russia, China, Cuba, and several other 
states. Yet, those same states embraced other rules 
of international law and had earlier signaled their 
acceptance of both self-defense and humanitarian 
law in the 2015 Group of Governmental Experts 
report.5 The next year, the U.K. attorney general 
disputed the existence of an international law rule 
prohibiting the violation of another state’s sover-
eignty by cyber means, a rule of long lineage that 
was previously widely understood to apply to cy-
ber operations. However, in the same speech, he 
endorsed other key international law rules such as 
the prohibition on cyber intervention into another 
state’s internal affairs and the right to self-defense 
against severe cyber attacks.6
Meanwhile, hostile cyber operations are on the 
rise, in both frequency and severity. Recall, for in-
stance, the use of cyber operations during the 
armed conflict with ISIL, the WannaCry attack that 
hobbled the National Health Service in the United 
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Kingdom, the NotPetya operation against Ukrainian 
cyber infrastructure that spread globally and caused 
billions of dollars in losses, and the use of cyber 
means to exploit the novel coronavirus pandemic. 
Given the rising importance of cyber conflict, there 
is an evident need to clarify how such attacks can be 
defined within the realm of international law. 
Despite these troubling occurrences, cyberspace 
is hardly a lawless void where the “strong do what 
they can and the weak suffer what they must.”7 In 
2017, a distinguished group of international law 
scholars and practitioners — the International 
Group of Experts — published the Tallinn Manu-
al 2.0 on the International Law Applicable to Cyber 
Operations.8 The product of a NATO Cooperative 
Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence project stretch-
ing over eight years, the manual contains 154 rules 
and nearly 500 pages of in-depth commentary on 
how extant international law applies in the cyber 
context. Since the manual’s publication, there has 
been a flood of scholarship on the subject.
At the governmental level, states have been ac-
tive since 2004 in a series of U.N. Groups of Gov-
ernmental Experts focused on information and 
communications technology. Three reports have 
been issued, the most significant of which was the 
Group of Governmental Experts consensus report 
of 2015. Endorsed by the U.N. General Assembly, 
the report included a short catalogue of interna-
tional law rules and principles that the participat-
ing states agreed applied to cyber activities, as well 
as “voluntary, non-binding norms of responsible 
state behavior” in cyberspace.9 And, there are pres-
ently two parallel U.N. processes underway: a sixth 
Group of Governmental Experts iteration and an 
7   Thucydides, History of the Peloponnesian War, trans. John H. Finley (New York: Modern Library, 1951).
8   Michael N. Schmitt, ed., Tallinn Manual 2.0 on the International Law Applicable to Cyber Operations, 2nd ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2017). 
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11   Commonwealth of Australia, Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Australia’s International Cyber Engagement Strategy, Oct. 2017, 90-1, 
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14   United Nations, UN Web TV, “Open-ended Working Group on Developments in the Field of Information and Telecommunications in the 
Context of International Security, Second Substantive Session,” Feb. 10–14, 2020 [hereafter OEWG], http://webtv.un.org/search/3rd-meeting-open-
ended-working-group-on-developments-in-the-field-of-information-and-telecommunications-in-the-context-of-international-security-second-sub-
stantive-session-10%E2%80%9314-february-2020/6131646836001/?term=%22Open%20Ended%20Working%20Group%22&lan=English&cat=Meet-
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Open-Ended Working Group. The former consists 
of representatives from 25 states, while the latter is 
open to all states.10 Clearly, cyberspace has taken 
center stage in international fora.
Just as importantly, individual states are begin-
ning to publicly express their views on the subject. 
Two statements on international law appended 
to Australia’s International Cyber Engagement 
Strategy,11 a letter on international law in cyber-
space from the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
to Parliament,12 a report on the issue released by 
the French Ministry of the Armies,13 and a discus-
sion by states of their views during an Open-End-
ed Working Group session in February 202014 rank 
among the most noteworthy statements issued on 
cyber operations and international law. 
Given the rising threat of hostile cyber opera-
tions, the importance of cyberspace to 21st-century 
societies, and the ongoing efforts to identify how 
international law applies in the cyber context, it is 
an appropriate moment to assess the prospects for 
international cyber law’s continued development. 
Some evolution in the applicable law is inevitable, 
for normative architecture must remain responsive 
to the context in which it applies if it is to be effec-
tive. And, the nature of that context is clear — the 
reliance of states and societies on cyberspace will 
continue to grow at a rapid pace while cyberspace 
will become an ever more dangerous environment 
in which to operate. The more that states rely upon 
cyberspace for essential functions, day-to-day ac-
tivities, and well-being, the starker their strategic 
choice becomes regarding the evolutionary vector 
of international law. Moreover, it will be a choice 
informed by the geopolitical priorities of states, 
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particularly whether they see international law as 
either supporting or impeding the achievement of 
those priorities.
To gauge the manner in which international law is 
likely to evolve, this article first evaluates how nor-
mative evolution is likely to occur. There are three 
possibilities: new treaty law, new customary law, 
and interpretation of extant rules of international 
law. Interpretation is likely to occupy most of the 
normative effort. Second, this article lays out the le-
gal-strategic options open to states in approaching 
law’s evolution. States are at a crossroads in that 
regard. Their attitudes toward the efficacy of inter-
national law in safeguarding their cyberspace deter-
mine the path they take. Lastly, this article assesses 
the general vector of international law’s evolution 
with respect to cyberspace. A trend is emerging — 
one that acknowledges the power of international 
law rules to hamper harmful cyber operations. 
The Means of Normative Evolution
To remain responsive to the realities of transna-
tional cyber activities, international law rules can 
develop in one of three ways — through treaties, 
new customary law, or interpretation of existing 
law (or a combination thereof). A new treaty gov-
erning cyberspace appears unlikely, at least on a 
global scale. Although Russia has recently secured 
support in the United Nations for considering this 
possibility and proffered a draft instrument on cy-
ber crime15 (despite the existence of the Budapest 
Convention, which has nearly 70 parties, on the 
same subject16), the move has faced widespread op-
position.17 Typical of the response of many states 
was Australia’s observation at an Open-Ended 
Working Group session in February 2020: 
A legally binding instrument in this space 
would take years to negotiate. It would likely 
end up with the lowest common denomina-
tor result and offer less protection than we 
15   U.N. General Assembly, “Countering the use of information and communications technologies for criminal purposes,” Resolution 74/247, Dec. 
27, 2019, https://undocs.org/en/A/RES/74/247; Draft United Nations Convention on Cooperation in Combating Cybercrime, Russia, 2017, Annexed 
to U.N. General Assembly, “Letter dated 11 October 2017 from the Permanent Representative of the Russian Federation to the United Nations 
addressed to the Secretary-General,” UN Doc. A/C.3/72/12*, Oct. 16, 2017, https://undocs.org/A/C.3/72/12.  
16  Council of Europe, “Convention on Cybercrime,” European Treaty Series No.185, Nov. 23, 2001, https://www.europarl.europa.eu/meet-
docs/2014_2019/documents/libe/dv/7_conv_budapest_/7_conv_budapest_en.pdf.
17   “Open Letter to UN General Assembly: Proposed International Convention on Cybercrime Poses a Threat to Human Rights Online,” Associ-
ation of Progressive Communications, Nov. 2019, https://www.apc.org/en/pubs/open-letter-un-general-assembly-proposed-international-conven-
tion-cybercrime-poses-threat-human.
18   See, OEWG.
19   See, e.g., Council of Europe, “Convention on Cybercrime,” 17-18.
20   As an example, the United States is bound by no treaty prohibiting cyber attacks against the civilian population during an armed conflict, but 
nevertheless acknowledged that it is bound by an unwritten customary international law rule to that effect.  “Department of Defense: Law of War 
Manual,” 1020-1021.
currently have with the existing framework. 
Having a treaty would also not solve the ques-
tion of how it would apply. We would still be 
left with the question of how to interpret it.18 
Cynicism about the motives behind the Russian 
proposal is rife, with concern that it is a subterfuge 
designed to limit the reach of international human 
rights law — particularly the rights to privacy and 
expression — into those states that support it. 
Such concern is well founded. 
Complicating matters is the current international 
political landscape. A treaty restricting cybercrime 
would require international cooperation. Unfortu-
nately, since 2016, the United States has demon-
strated a hostile attitude towards multilateralism 
and has proven wary of limiting its own actions 
through international agreements. Even if this ob-
stacle could be overcome, philosophical disagree-
ment exists over what and how to regulate. This 
fact is evidenced by the conflict between the con-
cepts of “cyber security” championed by liberal 
democracies and so-called “information security” 
supported by China and Russia. Whereas the for-
mer generally support the free flow of information, 
the latter seek to exert control over content. To il-
lustrate, Russia and China have refused to partic-
ipate in the Budapest Convention, in part because 
it cedes a degree of control over digital information 
that each state would otherwise enjoy.19 
“Crystallization” of new norms of customary 
international law is likewise unlikely. Customary 
international law consists of rules that are not 
found in a treaty but are nevertheless widely ac-
knowledged to be binding for states despite being 
unwritten.20 For instance, even though the United 
States is bound by no treaty provision that prohib-
its conducting attacks against civilians by kinetic 
or cyber means during an armed conflict, it recog-
nizes that customary law prohibits such attacks. 
Crystallization requires a sufficient degree of 
state practice over time combined with a belief that 
the practice is engaged in — or refrained from — 
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out of a sense of legal obligation.21 Satisfying these 
conditions with respect to cyber operations is un-
likely in the near future for a number of reasons. 
Most state cyber operations are highly classified 
or otherwise shielded from observation by other 
states. Practice that is not vis-
ible does not contribute to the 
crystallization of a new custom-
ary law. Additionally, states have 
shown a general reluctance to 
engage in the verbal practice that 
might suffice to fill that void. For 
example, they have seldom con-
demned the cyber operations of 
other states as violations of inter-
national law.
Along the same lines, statements by states setting 
forth the belief that the state practice is required by 
international law — the second condition for crys-
tallization of a new norm — are rare. Those that 
have been offered deal solely with the interpretation 
of existing norms in the cyber context. In addition, 
these interpretations tend to be broad, as with the 
U.S. acknowledgement in 2016 by the former State 
Department legal adviser that “cyber operations 
conducted by non-State actors are attributable to 
a State under the law of state responsibility when 
such actors engage in operations pursuant to the 
State’s instructions or under the State’s direction 
or control.”22 Such statements seldom delve into the 
gritty details of how to apply the rules in practice. 
In part, the unwillingness of many states to ar-
ticulate their legal positions with regard to cyber-
space is due to the principle of sovereign equality, 
by which any customary law norm that crystallizes 
binds all states. Thus, states are likely to be torn 
between acceptance of a new norm that constrains 
other states and acquiescence to restraints on their 
own cyber operations. The rapid pace of advanc-
es in cyber technology along with uncertainty as 
to how it will be employed in the future reinforce 
their hesitancy. It is unclear whether there are ad-
vantages to be gained by accepting constraints on 
cyber capabilities that may become more useful at 
a later date. This reality results in disagreement at 
the interagency level between departments and or-
ganizations responsible for defending against hos-
tile cyber operations and those tasked with con-
ducting cyber operations in the territory of other 
states in pursuit of their own state’s national inter-
ests. In the face of such impediments, the requisite 
21   United Nations, International Law Commission, “Draft Conclusions on Identification of Customary International Law, with Commentaries,” UN 
Doc A/73/10, 2018, https://legal.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/english/commentaries/1_13_2018.pdf.
22   Brian J. Egan, “Remarks on International Law and Stability in Cyberspace,” U.S. Department of State Archive, Nov. 10, 2016, https://www.law.
berkeley.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/12/egan-talk-transcript-111016.pdf.
articulation of legal views that is necessary for the 
crystallization of new norms is unlikely to develop 
in the foreseeable future. 
Of course, the same realities plague the interpre-
tation of existing rules of international law. How-
ever, as these rules already exist, there is greater 
incentive for states to interpret them in a manner 
that sets normative precedents, lest other states 
seize the interpretive high ground by establishing 
interpretations that serve their specific interests. 
Some states have wisely recognized that, even 
though they may not be able to reliably predict fu-
ture cyber technologies and practices, their nation-
al interests are best served by trying to shape the 
normative environment. This is where most of the 
normative activity regarding cyberspace will take 
place over the mid-term. 
States will continue to play the key role in this 
interpretive journey. For example, the work of the 
U.N. Groups of Governmental Experts, which are 
comprised of state representatives and the reports 
of which are endorsed by other states in the U.N. 
General Assembly, remains at the forefront of this 
effort. There is, however, a noticeable tendency to-
ward regional fragmentation among states and col-
laboration among like-minded states. For instance, 
although not binding law, most efforts to craft con-
fidence-building measures have been regional, as in 
the case of the Organization for Security and Co-
operation in Europe, the Organization of American 
States, and the Association of Southeast Asian Na-
tions. While like-minded efforts are especially pro-
nounced among the so-called “Five Eyes” (the Unit-
ed States, Canada, the United Kingdom, Australia, 
and New Zealand), there is frequent norm collab-
oration between Russia and China because of their 
shared objective of control over their populations. 
Non-state actors also have been active in the in-
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terpretive effort, as well as in the articulation of 
voluntary, non-binding norms. They enjoy great-
er normative agility than states because they can 
focus on objective interpretation without the in-
trusion of national policy concerns. More to the 
point, cyberspace is a multi-stakeholder domain. 
Companies such as Microsoft wield as much pow-
er in cyberspace as most states while the economic 
impact of cyber activities conducted by companies 
like Amazon is huge. 
As a result, certain non-state activities are exert-
ing significant influence on the interpretive process, 
which is certainly the case with respect to the Tal-
linn Manual 2.0 as it continues to serve as the pri-
mary reference point for how international law ap-
plies in cyberspace. Other efforts have also captured 
global attention, including Microsoft’s Digital Gene-
va Convention and the establishment of the Cyber-
Peace Institute. Indeed, states and non-state actors 
have been working together to examine norms for 
cyberspace, as is the case with Paris Call and the 
Global Commission on the Stability of Cyberspace. 
The positive influence of such endeavors is appar-
ent, for they operate to discredit the false narrative 
that cyberspace is a norm-less void. However, the 
development, interpretation, and implementation 
of international law remain primarily state-centric 
activities. The positions and interests of states in-
dicate the likeliest vector of international law in cy-
berspace. Although it is still early, the outlines of 
that vector are slowly taking shape. 
Strategic Options
States taking part in this interpretive venture are 
facing a crossroads. They can either choose a lib-
eral interpretation of existing laws or restrict their 
freedom by adopting narrower or more limited in-
terpretations of those laws. Both paths respond to 
the reliance on cyberspace by states and their pop-
ulations that is growing at a dizzying rate. 
On one hand, states may see international law as 
a valuable tool in combating hostile cyber opera-
tions. By this view, law deters harmful cyber activ-
ity conducted by or attributable to states because 
it allows the international community to condemn 
bad actors. The approach operates on the premise 
23   I discuss this dynamic more fully in Michael N. Schmitt, “Grey Zones in the International Law of Cyberspace,” The Yale Journal of Internation-
al Law Online 42, no. 2 (2017): 1-21, https://ssrn.com/abstract=3180687. 
24   See my analysis at Michael N. Schmitt, ‘“Virtual’ Disenfranchisement: Cyber Election Meddling in the Grey Zones of International Law,” Chica-
go Journal of International Law 19, no. 1 (2018): 30-67, https://chicagounbound.uchicago.edu/cjil/vol19/iss1/2/.  
25   See discussion in Schmitt, Tallinn Manual 2.0, 18-26. 
26   “Report of the International Law Commission on the work of its fifty-third session,” U.N. Doc. A/56/10, 2001 [hereafter Articles on State 
Responsibility], 32-33, https://legal.un.org/ilc/documentation/english/reports/a_56_10.pdf. 
that states do not want to be seen as violating in-
ternational law. There is ample evidence that this 
is so, for most states endeavor to style their actions 
as complying with international law even when 
they clearly do not — as in the case of Russian ac-
tivities in Ukraine. For states that have adopted the 
approach, international law rules serve as norma-
tive firewalls; their corresponding legal strategy is 
to strengthen those firewalls.
Its advocates are, therefore, likely to pursue clar-
ity in the rules and seek interpretive consensus. 
They believe that greater clarity prevents malicious 
state actors from exploiting potential ambiguity.23 
The U.S. response to election meddling by Russia 
in 2016 provides an example of this belief. Russia 
cleverly operated in the gray zone of international 
law with respect to the two rules its operations im-
plicated; the obligation to respect the sovereignty 
of other states and the prohibition on intervention 
into other states’ internal affairs. This hobbled the 
American response.24 Greater clarity in the appli-
cable international law rules would have provided 
Russia with less room to maneuver.
Clarity can also prevent unintended escalation. 
Consider a cyber operation causing effects lying in 
the gray zone of an ambiguous threshold, such as 
that at which territorial sovereignty is violated.25 
The state launching the operation believes that it 
did not cross the threshold, but the target state in-
terprets the rule as having a lower threshold and, 
therefore, considers the first state’s operation to 
be unlawful. As a “countermeasure,” a response 
that is only permissible against an unlawful cyber 
operation,26 the target state launches a hack that 
disables the cyber infrastructure of its adversary. 
Believing the response marks an escalation to un-
lawful operations, the first state mounts its own 
countermeasure. As this scenario illustrates, know-
ing where the normative red lines lie and having 
clarity as to the potential consequence under inter-
national law of crossing them has the potential to 
minimize escalatory misunderstandings. 
But, on the other hand, states may logically con-
clude that normative firewalls are counterproduc-
tive and, as a result, may work towards keeping 
them low. They might even intentionally foster nor-
mative ambiguity. Two motives underlie this legal 
strategy. First, states that exploit ambiguity with re-
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spect to how international law rules apply in the cy-
ber context will oppose clarification, for ambiguity 
affords them an advantage. This observation is par-
ticularly true of states that do not respect the rule of 
law when conducting operations against states that 
do, the so-called “rule of law states.” The former un-
derstand that rule of law states will take a cautious 
approach in the face of gray zone operations as they 
struggle to determine whether the operations they 
face are unlawful, and can be condemned as such, 
as well as whether they open the door to options 
that are only available in response to internationally 
wrongful acts like countermeasures. 
Second, rule of law states with a realist perspec-
tive on international relations might conclude that 
clarity gives adversaries that ignore legal strictures 
an asymmetrical advantage, for clear legal lines will 
— in practice — only limit the former’s operational 
flexibility. They are a one-way normative firewall. 
By embracing ambiguity, rule of law states can re-
tain the operational flexibility necessary to pick and 
choose how to characterize their opponents’ cyber 
operations and determine when they have a right 
under international law to respond. They can beat 
their opponents at their own game. It is a rational, 
albeit internationally destabilizing, approach.
The Substantive Rules
It is instructive to look at how states are ap-
proaching a number of key international law rules. 
Although only a few states have publicly set forth 
their views, those views are representative of 
trends that are apparent across a wide range of 
states. States are embracing international law rules 
rather than ambiguity; they see normative firewalls 
both as protection against hostile cyber operations 
and as providing legal justification when they need 
to respond robustly to such operations. 
Sovereignty 
An ongoing debate over sovereignty in cyber-
space is perhaps the most revealing indicator of 
the strategic direction in which states are moving 
with respect to interpreting international law. The 
International Group of Experts that published the 
Tallinn Manual 2.0 concluded that remotely con-
ducted cyber operations can violate the sovereign-
27   See, Schmitt, Tallinn Manual 2.0, 11-26.
28   See, Wright Address.
29   See, Michael Schmitt and Liis Vihul, “Respect for Sovereignty in Cyberspace,” Texas Law Review 95 (Nov. 3, 2017): 1639-1670, https://ssrn.
com/abstract=3180669. 
ty of the state into which they are conducted — the 
target state — on the basis of either territorial invi-
olability or interference with, or usurpation of, an 
inherently governmental function.27 
For the International Group of Experts, a viola-
tion of territoriality occurs when certain effects of 
the cyber operation manifest on the territory of 
the target state, whether on the government’s cy-
ber infrastructure or that of private entities. Qual-
ifying effects include physical damage, injury, and 
the relatively permanent loss of functionality of the 
targeted cyber infrastructure — or of infrastructure 
that relies upon it. By contrast, a sovereignty viola-
tion based on interference with, or usurpation of, 
an inherently governmental function requires no 
particular physical effects. For example, conducting 
an operation that even temporarily disables election 
machinery, thereby affecting the vote count, would 
qualify as a violation based on territoriality, where-
as a remote search of databases on another state’s 
territory would illustrate the usurpation of an inher-
ently governmental act, law enforcement. 
Following the publication of the Tallinn Manu-
al 2.0, observers expected significant debate over 
how sovereignty could be violated short of causing 
damage or injury as well as over which functions 
qualify as inherently governmental. That important 
debate was sidetracked in May 2018 by the United 
Kingdom’s articulation of a view that sovereignty 
is a principle of international law from which rules 
like the prohibitions on intervention and the use of 
force derive — but that is not a rule in itself.28 In 
other words, remotely conducted cyber operations 
into the territory of other states never amount to 
an internationally wrongful act on the basis of hav-
ing violated sovereignty. 
The premise that there is no rule of sovereignty 
flies in the face of extensive practice by states and 
international organizations over many decades, 
as well as judicial pronouncements by the Inter-
national Court of Justice and domestic courts.29 It 
also runs counter to the first of the strategic ap-
proaches, which holds that international law has 
protective value. This fact provoked a quick reac-
tion from other states. In the aforementioned July 
2019 letter to Parliament, the Dutch Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs confirmed, accurately as a matter 
of law, that “Respect for the sovereignty of other 
countries is an obligation in its own right, the vio-
lation of which may in turn constitute an interna-
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tionally wrongful act.”30 In other words, sovereign-
ty is a rule of law having prescriptive effect. That 
the statement came from a NATO ally that is a gen-
erally like-minded state is of particular significance 
as a (deserved) rebuke to the British position.
The most robust pushback, however, came from 
France, which not only rejected the British position but 
has set forth its own position on when it will deem a 
cyber operation a violation of French sovereignty:
Any cyberattack against French digital sys-
tems or any effects produced on French ter-
ritory by digital means by a State organ, a 
person or an entity exercising elements of 
governmental authority or by a person or 
persons acting on the instructions of or un-
der the direction or control of a State consti-
tutes a breach of sovereignty.31  
This French position describes an extremely low 
threshold of violation, albeit one that is defensi-
ble. Moreover, it defines any cyber attack against 
French digital systems, which presumably signifies 
30  Netherlands MFA Letter, 2.
31   Ministry of the Armies Position Paper, 7.
32   OEWG, fourth session. The Czech approach was especially broad, including in addition to the standard territorial integrity and inherently 
governmental function violations, “a cyber operation causing damage to, or disruption of, cyber or other infrastructure with significant impact on 
national security, economy, public health or environment.”
government systems, or the causation of effects, 
which would extend to not only private cyber infra-
structure but also knock-on effects more broadly, 
as a violation of sovereignty. 
Other states are beginning to announce their 
views. For instance, at the February 2020 session of 
the Open-Ended Working Group, Switzerland, Aus-
tria, and the Czech Republic supported the “sov-
ereignty-is-a-rule” approach that had been adopt-
ed by the Netherlands and France.32 To date, no 
state has adopted the British view. Even the United 
States has hedged its bets. At an address during 
the U.S. Cyber Command annual conference in 
March 2020, Department of Defense General Coun-
sel Paul Ney noted,
As a threshold matter, in analyzing pro-
posed cyber operations, DoD lawyers take 
into account the principle of State sover-
eignty. States have sovereignty over the in-
formation and communications technology 
infrastructure within their territory. The 
implications of sovereignty for cyberspace 
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are complex, and we continue to study this 
issue and how State practice evolves in this 
area, even if it does not appear that there 
exists a rule that all infringements on sov-
ereignty in cyberspace necessarily involve 
violations of international law.33
A careful parsing of Ney’s statement reveals that 
it is not inconsistent with the views of those sup-
porting sovereignty as a rule. For instance, sov-
ereignty advocates do not claim that all remotely 
conducted cyber operations violate sovereignty. 
Ney’s reference to the phrase “necessarily involve” 
suggests that there are cyber operations that will 
violate sovereignty. That the United States is “con-
tinuing to study” the issue and watching state 
practice indicates that it is leaving open the pros-
pect of joining the sovereignty-is-a-rule group — a 
move that would force the United Kingdom to re-
think its legally implausible position. 
Finally, it is important to note that both Russia 
and China are strong supporters of sovereignty, al-
though their motive is to use the principle as the 
basis for controlling the cyber activities of people 
within their territories and of their nationals abroad. 
In doing so, they are overemphasizing the signifi-
cance of sovereignty by failing to pay adequate heed 
to the fact that the enjoyment of sovereignty must 
be exercised without prejudice to international hu-
man rights law. But, their approach does signal the 
influence of the rule and the extent to which states 
view it as having protective value for their interests 
— malign though those interests may be.
Intervention
Interestingly, interpretive discussions regarding 
the prohibition on intervention into the internal or 
external affairs of other states, which is universally 
accepted as a rule,34 has recently tended to focus on 
how to accommodate the normative void that would 
be created by dispensing with the rule of sovereignty. 
It is well accepted that a violation of the prohi-
bition on intervention requires two elements: that 
33   Paul C. Ney, Jr., “DOD General Counsel Remarks at U.S. Cyber Command Legal Conference,” U.S. Department of Defense, Mar. 2, 2020, 
https://www.defense.gov/Newsroom/Speeches/Speech/Article/2099378/dod-general-counsel-remarks-at-us-cyber-command-legal-conference/. 
See my analysis of the speech in Michael N. Schmitt, “The Defense Department’s Measured Take on International Law in Cyberspace,” Just Security, 
Mar. 11, 2020, https://www.justsecurity.org/69119/the-defense-departments-measured-take-on-international-law-in-cyberspace/.
34   2015 GGE, 12-13.  On the prohibition generally, see, Schmitt, Tallinn Manual 2.0, 312-324.
35   International Court of Justice (ICJ), Reports of Judgements, Advisory Opinions and Orders, “Case Concerning Military and Paramilitary Activi-
ties In and Against Nicaragua (Nicaragua. v. United States of America),” June 27, 1986, 14, 97-98, https://www.icj-cij.org/files/case-related/70/070-
19860627-JUD-01-00-EN.pdf.
36   See, Australia’s International Cyber Engagement Strategy, “2019 International Law Supplement.”
37   On the COVID-19-related hostile cyber operations and international law, see, Marko Milanovic and Michael N. Schmitt, “Cyber Attacks and 
Cyber (Mis)information Operations during a Pandemic,” Journal of National Security Law & Policy (forthcoming, published on-line May 28, 2020), 
https://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3612019.   
the object of the intervention involves an area of 
activity that international law leaves to the state 
(the so-called internal or external affairs of a state) 
and that the action be coercive in nature.35 As ex-
plained by the Australian Department of Foreign 
Affairs and Trade in its International Cyber En-
gagement Strategy, 
A prohibited intervention is one that inter-
feres by coercive means (in the sense that 
they effectively deprive another state of the 
ability to control, decide, or govern matters 
of an inherently sovereign nature), either di-
rectly or indirectly, in matters that a state 
is permitted by the principle of state sover-
eignty to decide freely. Such matters include 
a state’s economic, political, and social sys-
tems, and foreign policy.36 
The term “internal or external affairs” is often 
misunderstood as referring to the target of a cyber 
operation. However, the concept actually refers to 
the area of activity that the state conducting the 
operation hopes to coerce. For instance, the Wan-
naCry operation by North Korea impacted the Unit-
ed Kingdom’s health sector, but as a ransomware 
attack it was not designed to coerce any change in 
U.K. health policy or delivery. By contrast, some 
of the cyber operations related to the novel coro-
navirus pandemic, if attributable to a state, would 
amount to intervention. An example would be the 
malicious cyber operations that disabled a novel 
coronavirus testing facility in the Czech Republic. 
These attacks made it impossible for that state to 
fully execute its crisis management plan for dealing 
with the pandemic.37 
In terms of trend analysis, the fact that the pro-
hibition’s existence is uncontroversial supports the 
premise that law serves a valuable protective func-
tion. What has been particularly noteworthy is the 
tendency of those who question sovereignty — or 
are concerned about the weakening of the rule — to 
look to the rule prohibiting intervention to fill any 
protective gaps that would be left by the absence of 
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a rule of sovereignty.38 This could be accomplished 
by either relaxing the scope of the term “internal or 
external affairs” through interpretation or by lower-
ing the threshold at which an attempt to influence 
becomes unlawful coercion.39 With respect to the 
former option, “internal or external affairs” could 
be interpreted more broadly to include the target 
of the cyber operation and not just the activity or 
policy that the state conducting the cyber operation 
hopes to coerce. If this were to be done, operations 
like WannaCry would qualify as intervention. In-
deed, in the same Chatham House speech in which 
he rejected sovereignty, the U.K. attorney general 
adopted this approach: “Acts like the targeting of 
essential medical services are no less prohibited in-
terventions, or even armed attacks, when they are 
committed by cyber means.”40
Most discussion within the interna-
tional law community, however, centers 
on the element of coercion, as 
was the case at a May 2020 work-
shop held by the University of 
Oxford’s Institute for Ethics, Law 
and Armed Conflict.41 Advocates 
of lowering the threshold at which 
mere influence becomes unlawful 
coercion, thereby satisfying the 
second element of intervention, 
argue that a hostile cyber opera-
tion should not necessarily have to deprive a state 
of all reasonable choice, so long as it renders making 
the choice difficult. The problem is that, as a result, 
applying the rule becomes more challenging be-
cause “no reasonable choice” is an easier threshold 
to apply than “making the choice difficult.” Interpre-
tive creativity is simply no panacea for weakening 
the impact of sovereignty. But, the point to be made 
is that both states and international law experts — 
faced with one key state’s rejection of the sovereign-
ty rule — are working hard to find a way to interpret 
international law so as to retain its protective effect. 
38   On the relationship between sovereignty and intervention, see, Harriet Moynihan, “The Application of International Law to State Cyberat-
tacks: Sovereignty and Non-intervention,” Chatham House Research Paper, December 2019, https://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/default/files/
publications/research/2019-11-29-Intl-Law-Cyberattacks.pdf.
39   Indeed, in his speech Attorney General Wright asserted that “The precise boundaries of this principle are the subject of ongoing debate 
between states, and not just in the context of cyber space.”  See, Wright Address.
40   Wright Address.
41   The author was in attendance.
42   For a discussion of due diligence, see Schmitt, Tallinn Manual 2.0, 30-50. 
43   International Court of Justice, Reports of Judgements, Advisory Opinions and Orders, “The Corfu Channel Case (Merits),” April 9, 1949, 22, 
https://www.icj-cij.org/files/case-related/1/001-19490409-JUD-01-00-EN.pdf. 
44   U.N. Conference on Environment and Development, “Rio Declaration on Environment and Development,” U.N. Doc. A/CONF.151/26/ (Vol. I), 
Aug. 12, 1992, 1, https://www.un.org/en/development/desa/population/migration/generalassembly/docs/globalcompact/A_CONF.151_26_Vol.I_
Declaration.pdf.
Due diligence
Also indicative of the trend toward viewing in-
ternational law as an effective normative firewall 
against hostile cyber operations is the growing ten-
dency of states to embrace the rule of due diligence. 
This rule requires states to put an end to hostile cy-
ber operations by other states or non-state actors 
that are mounted either from within or through 
their territory when the operations affect a legal 
right of another state and cause serious adverse 
consequences.42 For instance, if a hacktivist group 
is launching cyber operations from one state against 
another state’s government systems, the first state 
would be required to take all feasible measures to 
terminate the operations. Such measures could 
range from law enforcement to a technical solution.
Although the due diligence rule was set forth by 
the International Court of Justice in its first case, 
Corfu Channel,43 and appears prominently in var-
ious specialized bodies of law (most notably in-
ternational environmental law44) states have been 
hesitant to acknowledge its existence. Some states 
appear concerned that the burden of compliance 
would be onerous given the number of hostile cy-
ber operations that are mounted from within their 
territory. For instance, the obligation was set forth 
as a voluntary non-binding norm in both the 2013 
and 2015 Group of Governmental Experts reports 
because the consensus to characterize it as a bind-
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ing norm in either report could not be achieved.45 
However, as states have become aware of the nu-
merous limitations that are placed on the due dil-
igence obligation,46 particularly the absence of any 
requirement to take preventive measures and an 
obligation only to take measures that are feasible in 
the circumstances, they are beginning to accept the 
rule. For instance, both the Netherlands and France 
did so in 2019 and Finland took a very expansive 
view of the obligation at the February 2020 session 
of the Open-Ended Working Group.47 The most in-
teresting statement to date has come from Austral-
ia, which seemed to straddle the fence in its Inter-
national Cyber Engagement Strategy. On the one 
hand, it observed, “To the extent that a state enjoys 
… sovereignty over objects and activities within its 
territory, it necessarily shoulders corresponding re-
sponsibilities to ensure [they] are not used to harm 
other states.” This language is that of binding rules. 
But, Australia went on to enumerate the require-
ments as if it was a voluntary, non-binding norm 
using the term “should”: “[I]f a state is aware of 
an internationally wrongful act originating from or 
routed through its territory, and it has the ability to 
put an end to the harmful activity, that state should 
take reasonable steps to do so consistent with inter-
national law.”48 
Other states — such as Germany, Estonia, Finland, 
the Republic of Korea, and Spain — have also sup-
ported the rule’s binding nature in various official 
and unofficial fora, while no state has publicly reject-
ed the rule as such. Rather, states that are unwilling 
to acknowledge the rule’s binding character generally 
take the position that it has not yet matured to that 
level and, therefore, may only be put forward as a vol-
untary, non-binding norm. What does appear clear is 
that states support the notion that members of the 
international community have a responsibility to en-
sure their territory is not used as the base of hostile 
cyber operations. The growing number of states that 
accept the rule as “hard law” is further indication of 
a trend towards treating international law as an effec-
tive tool in deterring harmful cyber activities. 
45   2013 GGE Report, 8; 2015 GGE Report, 8.
46   See my thoughts in this regard in Michael N. Schmitt, “In Defense of Due Diligence in Cyberspace,” 125 Yale Law Journal Forum 68 (2015), 
https://ssrn.com/abstract=2622077. 
47   Netherlands MFA Letter, 4-5; Ministry of the Armies Position Paper, 10; Statement of Finland, in OEWG, at third meeting. Finland suggested, 
“If harmful cyber activities take place and cause serious harm to another state, the state of origin must take appropriate action to terminate it, as 
well as to investigate the incident and bring those responsible to justice.”
48   Australia’s International Cyber Engagement Strategy, 91. Emphasis added by author.
49   UN Charter art. 2(4). See also, Schmitt, Tallinn Manual 2.0, 329-30. 
50   2015 GGE Report, 12.
51   U. N. General Assembly, “Developments in the field of information and telecommunications,” Resolution 70/237, Dec. 23, 2015.
52   ICJ, “Case Concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities,” 103-104.
53   Schmitt, Tallinn Manual 2.0, 331-337. 
Use of force
This trend is augmented by the tendency of 
states to view international law as a normative 
barrier against unlawful uses of force. All states 
agree that the prohibition on the use of force, res-
ident in Article 2(4) of the U.N. Charter and cus-
tomary law, is a binding rule of international law 
applicable to cyber operations.49 Indeed, the 2015 
Group of Governmental Experts report specifical-
ly “identified as of central importance the com-
mitments of States to the following principles of 
the Charter and other international law ... refrain-
ing in their international relations from the threat 
or use of force.”50 The report was subsequently 
endorsed by the General Assembly.51
Clearly, a cyber operation that causes signifi-
cant physical damage or injury qualifies as a use of 
force. As with sovereignty, the notion of functional 
damage was adopted as the equivalent of physical 
damage for the purposes of this prohibition. Inter-
estingly, no state has opposed this interpretation 
— one which would apply almost exclusively in the 
cyber context. 
More importantly, a number of states have ac-
cepted the International Group of Experts’ adop-
tion of the “scale and effects” test from the law 
of self-defense for evaluating cyber operations that 
do not cause such effects with respect to the pro-
hibition on the use of force.52 The International 
Group of Experts held that the prohibition extend-
ed beyond physical damage (including the relative-
ly permanent loss of functionality) or injury and 
that certain factors would influence states when 
assessing whether a particular cyber operation 
qualifies as a use of force. It identified a number 
of non-exhaustive factors that states were likely to 
consider when making that determination. The list 
included severity, immediacy, directness, invasive-
ness, measurability of effects, military character, 
state involvement, presumptive legitimate legality, 
identity of the attacker, record of cyber operations 
by the attacker, and nature of the target.53 
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Along the same lines, the Netherlands took the 
position in 2019:
It is necessary … to examine both qualitative 
and quantitative factors. The Tallinn Manual 
2.0 refers to a number of factors that could 
play a role in this regard, including how se-
rious and far-reaching the cyber operation’s 
consequences are, whether the operation is 
military in nature and whether it is carried 
out by a state.54
The Netherlands went on to address the oft-
asked question of whether a non-destructive cyber 
operation against the economy could ever qualify 
as a use of force: “At this time it cannot be ruled 
out that a cyber operation with a very serious fi-
nancial or economic impact may qualify as the use 
of force.”55 This view is a significant indicator of 
the extent to which the Netherlands, which is a 
thought leader in the field, treats international law 
as protective in the cyber context. 
And, the Netherlands is not alone. The same 
year, France noted:
In the absence of physical damage, a cy-
ber-operation can be considered use of force 
in the light of several criteria, … such as 
the origin of the operation and the nature 
of the instigator (military or non-military), 
the degree of intrusion, the effects caused or 
sought by the operation, or the nature of the 
target. These criteria are, of course, not ex-
haustive. For example, penetrating military 
systems with a view to weakening French 
defense capabilities, or to finance or train 
individuals so that they can perpetrate cy-
berattacks against France could well qualify 
as the use of force.56 
With respect to economic damage, France went 
even further than the Netherlands: “A cyberattack 
could be categorised as an armed attack if it caused 
substantial loss of life or considerable physical or 
economic damage.”57 The reference to “armed at-
tack” — the threshold for using force in self-defense 
54   Netherlands MFA Letter, 4. See also, Australia’s International Cyber Engagement Strategy, 90: “In determining whether a … cyber activity, 
constitutes a use of force, states should consider whether the activity’s scale and effects are comparable to traditional kinetic operations that rise 
to the level of use of force.”
55   Netherlands MFA Letter, 4.
56   Ministry of the Armies Position Paper, 7.
57   Ministry of the Armies Position Paper, 8.
58   ICJ, “Case Concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities,” 101-102.
59   ICJ, “Case Concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities,” 118-119.
60   Articles on State Responsibility, 75-76, 129-139; Schmitt, Tallinn Manual 2.0, 111-5. 
— is particularly telling, for most states have adopt-
ed the position set forth by the International Court 
of Justice in its Nicaragua judgment that an “armed 
attack” is the “most grave form” of a use of force.58 
Overall, there are strong indications that states 
would like to see normative barriers against the 
use of force go up in order to protect their cyber 
assets and activities. This desire has been signaled 
by the lack of any opposition to the functionality 
approach, the adoption of the scale and effects 
test for non-physical effects, and the indication by 
some states that even cyber operations solely af-
fecting the economy could amount to an unlawful 
use of force — a prohibition that had heretofore 
been primarily restricted to operations that caused 
physical damage or injury, or, as in the Nicaragua 
case, activities in support of operations having 
those effects.59 Thus, the trend with respect to the 
use of force tracks all that appears to be emerging 
with regard to other internationally wrongful acts, 
including violation of sovereignty, intervention, 
and the failure to exercise due diligence.
Responses 
Interestingly, normative barriers to response op-
tions may be lowering. States want international 
law to not only shield them from hostile cyber op-
erations but also allow them to engage in robust 
cyber responses that they deem necessary to pro-
tect themselves. They look to so-called “circum-
stances precluding wrongfulness” to achieve this 
objective. Circumstances precluding wrongfulness 
allow a state to conduct cyber or non-cyber opera-
tions that would otherwise be unlawful. They ren-
der unlawful acts — which may include actions or 
omissions — lawful. 
Consider “countermeasures”: responses to un-
lawful cyber operations that themselves would be 
unlawful except for the fact that they are designed 
to compel another state (the “responsible state”) 
into desisting in its unlawful course of conduct 
and providing the “injured state” whatever repara-
tions might be due.60 Most states appear to accept 
the legality of countermeasures and have shown a 
willingness to adapt their use to the cyber context. 
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 There are other 
indications that states 
  are uncomfortable 
with stringent limitations 
 on their right to 
self-defense in cyberspace.
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This approach is best illustrated with respect to 
the purported “notice” requirement.
The U.N. International Law Commission’s Ar-
ticles on State Responsibility suggest that a state 
should normally provide notice of its intention to 
engage in countermeasures.61 Nevertheless, states 
have repeatedly emphasized that the requirement 
of notice in the cyber context is tempered by the 
urgency of the need to respond. For example, 
France has taken the position that:
The victim State may, in certain circum-
stances, derogate from the obligation to no-
tify … where there is a need to protect its 
rights. This possibility of adopting urgent 
countermeasures is all the more appropri-
ate in cyberspace given the predominance 
of concealment and traceability difficulties.62
Similarly, the Netherlands has noted that, “if im-
mediate action is required in order to enforce the 
rights of the injured state and prevent further dam-
age, such notification may be dispensed with.”63 Cy-
ber operations can unfold in a fraction of a second. 
Interpreting the rule as requiring notice of counter-
measures in every case would be impractical.
The most progressive position in this regard 
was set forth by the United Kingdom in 2018. In 
his speech at Chatham House, the attorney gener-
al observed, “We would not agree that we are al-
ways legally obliged to give prior notification … it 
could not be right for international law to require 
a countermeasure to expose highly sensitive capa-
bilities.”64 The formulation is significant. Whereas 
other countries focus on the urgency of the need 
to take countermeasures and the impracticality of 
providing notice, the British approach tenders the 
preservation of highly classified cyber capabilities as 
further justification. 
Also indicative of the trend towards interpreting 
61   Articles on State Responsibility, 119-120, 135-137. The Articles are not binding law themselves, but are widely viewed as accurately reflecting 
customary international law in most part. 
62   Ministry of the Armies Position Paper, 8.
63   Netherlands MFA Letter, 7. See also the submission of the United States to the 2014-2015 GGE, “Applicability of International Law to Con-
flicts in Cyberspace,” in CarrieLyn D. Guymon, ed., Digest of United States Practice in International Law (2014), 732, 739, https://2009-2017.state.
gov/documents/organization/244504.pdf: “[the State] generally must call upon the responsible State to cease its wrongful conduct, unless urgent 
countermeasures are necessary to preserve the injured State’s rights.”
64   Wright Address.
65   Articles on State Responsibility, 129.
66   Office of the President, Estonia, “President of the Republic at the Opening of CyCon 2019,” May 29, 2019, https://president.ee/en/official-du-
ties/speeches/15241-president-of-the-republic-at-the-opening-of-cycon-2019/. 
67   Ministry of the Armies Position Paper, 7.
68   Department of Defense, “Summary: Cyber Strategy,” 2018, 4, https://media.defense.gov/2018/Sep/18/2002041658/-1/-1/1/CYBER_STRAT-
EGY_SUMMARY_FINAL.PDF%20. See also, The White House, “National Cyber Strategy of the United States,” Sept. 2018, 20-21, https://www.
whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2018/09/National-Cyber-Strategy.pdf; U.S. Cyber Command, “Achieve and Maintain Cyberspace Superiority: 
Command Vision for US Cyber Command,” April 2018, https://www.cybercom.mil/Portals/56/Documents/USCYBERCOM%20Vision%20April%20
2018.pdf?ver=2018-06-14-152556-010.
international law in a manner that allows for ef-
fective responses to hostile cyber operations is an 
emerging discussion of collective countermeasures. 
In its commentary accompanying the Articles on 
State Responsibility, the International Law Commis-
sion noted that cases of countermeasures by an en-
tity other than an injured state are “controversial 
and the practice is embryonic,”65 leading to the pre-
vailing view that they are impermissible. Yet, in 2019, 
Estonian President Kersti Kaljulaid asserted that:
states which are not directly injured may 
apply countermeasures to support the 
state directly affected by the malicious cy-
ber operation … International security and 
the rules-based international order have 
long benefitted from collective efforts to 
stop the violations.66
This position is sensible for states that may lack 
the wherewithal to mount effective countermeas-
ures against hostile cyber operations on their own. 
To date, only France has openly disagreed with the 
Estonian position, albeit without explaining the ba-
sis for its opposition.67 
Most noteworthy vis-a-vis responses falling below 
the threshold of armed attacks, which allows for 
the use of cyber or non-cyber force in self-defense, 
is the current U.S. approach. According to the U.S. 
Department of Defense’s 2018 Cyber Strategy, U.S. 
forces intend to “[p]ersistently contest malicious 
cyber activity in day-to-day competition: The De-
partment will counter cyber campaigns threaten-
ing U.S. military advantage by defending forward 
to intercept and halt cyber threats.”68 Although not 
framed in legal terms, such a strategy would be dif-
ficult to square with a restrictive interpretation of 
the right to take countermeasures like the one that 
suggests advance notice of the intent to take coun-
termeasures is required as a matter of law.
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States have also discovered the “plea of necessi-
ty,” which seldom drew attention prior to the ad-
vent of cyber operations. Like countermeasures, 
this plea is a circumstance precluding wrongful-
ness. It is available when a state is facing “grave 
and imminent peril” to an “essential interest” and 
no means of putting an end to that peril exists 
other than actions that would be considered un-
lawful under different circumstances.69 Impor-
tantly, victim states can rely upon the plea of ne-
cessity when the otherwise unlawful response to 
a qualifying hostile cyber operation would violate 
a legal obligation owed to a state that had noth-
ing to do with the grave and imminent peril. This 
distinction is especially significant, for, unlike 
countermeasures, states can turn to the plea of 
necessity to justify operations against non-state 
actors or in situations in which the identity of the 
attacker is unclear.
France has announced that it “does not exclude 
the possibility of invoking the state of distress to 
protect an essential interest against a cyberattack 
below the threshold of military aggression consti-
tuting a serious danger that is imminent.”70 And, 
while the precise parameters of the concepts of 
“grave,” “imminent,” and “essential interest” are 
unsettled, the Netherlands has suggested that, 
“in the government’s view[,] services such as the 
electricity grid, water supply and the banking 
system certainly fall into this category.”71 Oth-
er states are likely to embrace the plea for crisis 
management purposes, for — again as noted by 
the Netherlands — “[t]his ground for justification 
is primarily aimed at giving a state the opportuni-
ty to protect its own interests and minimise the 
damage it suffers.”72 
The circumstance precluding wrongfulness that 
allows for the most robust response is an “armed 
attack” justifying a use of force in self-defense 
pursuant to Article 51 of the U.N. Charter and 
customary law.73 A cyber operation that generates 
significant damage, destruction, injury, or death 
would surely qualify as an armed attack. Howev-
69   Articles on State Responsibility, 80-84.
70   Ministry of the Armies Position Paper, 8.
71   Netherlands MFA Letter, 8.
72   Netherlands MFA Letter, 8.
73   UN Charter Art. 51. See also, Schmitt, Tallinn Manual 2.0, 333-347. 
74   Netherlands MFA Letter, 9. 
75   Ministry of the Armies Position Paper, 8.
76   The Netherlands, Ministry of Defence, “Keynote Address by the Minister of Defence, Ms. Ank Bijleveld, Marking the First Anniversary of the 
Tallinn Manual 2.0,” June 20, 2018, https://english.defensie.nl/downloads/speeches/2018/06/21/keynote-address-by-the-minister-of-defence-ms.-
ank-bijleveld-marking-the-first-anniversary-of-the-tallinn-manual-2.0-on-the-20th-of-june-2018.
77   See, e.g., “Applicability of International Law to Conflicts,” 735; Wright Address; Netherlands MFA Letter, 9; Ministry of the Armies Position 
Paper, 9 (accumulation of effects).
er, as emphasized by the Netherlands, “At present 
there is no international consensus on qualifying 
a cyberattack as an armed attack if it does not 
cause fatalities, physical damage or destruction 
yet nevertheless has very serious non-material 
consequences.”74 
Again, France is a trailblazer in interpreting the 
norm. In 2019, it announced,
A cyberattack could qualify as an armed at-
tack when it causes substantial loss of life 
or significant physical or economic damage. 
This would be the case of an operation in 
cyberspace affecting critical infrastructure 
with significant consequences, or likely to 
paralyze whole sectors of the country’s ac-
tivity, to trigger administrative or ecologi-
cal disasters and to cause many victims.75
In making this announcement, France became 
the first state to unequivocally take a view that the 
notion of an armed attack includes cyber opera-
tions that do not cause physical damage or injury 
at all. Rather, the approach focuses on the severity 
of an operation. This focus was a possibility that 
had been raised earlier by the Netherlands’ min-
ister of defense, although it does not explicitly ap-
pear in the most recent expression of Dutch views 
on how international law applies in cyberspace.76 
There are other indications that states are un-
comfortable with stringent limitations on their 
right to self-defense in cyberspace. Some have ex-
pressed the view that the right includes defense 
against cyber operations conducted by non-state 
actors if the operations cause consequences at the 
armed attack level. In these cases, self-defense 
against non-state actors can be conducted in an-
other state’s territory when the territorial state is 
“unable or unwilling” to take action against the 
operations. Some states have also taken the po-
sition that states are entitled to aggregate effects 
of a series of related hostile cyber operations to 
reach the severity threshold of self-defense.77 
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For its part, even though France has rejected the 
premise that an armed attack can be conducted 
by a non-state actor with no affiliation to a state, 
it hedges its bets: “[I]t cannot be ruled out that 
general practice may shift towards an interpreta-
tion of the law of self-defence as being authorised 
in response to an armed attack by non-state ac-
tors whose acts are not attributable to a State.”78
Finally, states are confirming that there is a right 
to anticipatory self-defense. Of particular note, Aus-
tralia has taken the position that it may respond in 
self-defense when “the attacker is clearly commit-
ted to launching an armed attack, in circumstances 
where the victim will lose its last opportunity to 
effectively defend itself unless it acts.”79 It points 
to the possibility of a threatened offensive cyber 
operation at the armed attack level that could 
“cause large-scale loss of human life and damage 
to critical infrastructure. Such an attack might be 
launched in a split-second … Is it seriously to be 
suggested that a state has no right to take action 
before that split-second?” Since no state in such a 
situation would likely hesitate to defend itself, the 
Australian interpretation is prescient. 
In fairness, there are a few indicators that ap-
pear contrary to the broad trend towards ensur-
ing international law is interpreted in a manner 
that allows leeway for victim state responses. 
For instance, there now appears to be a growing 
consensus that countermeasures must be “neces-
sary” in the sense of there being no alternative 
to taking them to resolve the situation80 and that 
they do not allow for the use of force.81 Further-
more, some states still cling to a traditional in-
terpretation of circumstances precluding wrong-
fulness, as France does with respect to collective 
countermeasures and self-defense against non-
state actors. And, recall that Russia, China, and a 
number of other states were unwilling to mention 
the term “self-defense” or include text referring 
to countermeasures in the aborted final report of 
the 2016-2017 Group of Governmental Experts. But 
the interpretive vector certainly points in the di-
rection of a liberal interpretation of circumstanc-
es precluding wrongfulness, signaling support for 
relying on international law as a viable and useful 
tool in the fight against hostile cyber operations. 
78   Ministry of the Armies Position Paper, 9.
79   Australia’s International Cyber Engagement Strategy, “2019 International Law Supplement;” see also, Schmitt, Tallinn Manual 2.0, 351-353.
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Concluding Thoughts
It is clear that the prospects for new laws appli-
cable to cyberspace are slim. Instead, most pro-
gress will come in the form of the interpretation of 
longstanding rules of international law, primarily by 
states. That interpretation is likely to be motivated 
by a prevailing perception that international law is a 
useful normative firewall against hostile cyber oper-
ations attributable to or launched from within other 
states. This approach is a laudatory one that will en-
hance stability and security in cyberspace. 
Yet, there will be obstacles along the way. As not-
ed, states sometimes cherry-pick amongst inter-
national law rules to suit themselves. To embrace 
certain rules of international law while rejecting 
others without a sound legal basis for doing so is 
to place the entire normative enterprise at risk. 
Moreover, some states will continue to profess fi-
delity to international legal norms while violating 
them with impunity — as is common with respect 
to international human rights law obligations. And, 
short-sighted tactics are impeding an interpretive 
journey that will benefit all members of the inter-
national community. Hopefully, governments will 
grasp the long-term costs of such strategies.
Nevertheless, there are reasons to be optimistic. 
The vector of the interpretive efforts in support of 
international law is clearly positive, and the scope 
and pace of such efforts are growing. Of greatest sig-
nificance is the commitment of many states to en-
suring that cyberspace becomes and remains a rule 
of law domain. Such states are to be commended. 
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